In this case “[i]t is…undisputed that the remaining eleven months that the motion was pending were not excluded. Accordingly, the Act’s 70‐day indictment‐to‐trial period (commonly referred to as the “speedy trial clock”) was exceeded by approximately nine months.” Bert, at P. 8. “Accordingly, neither party contests that a violation of the Speedy Trial Act occurred. Nor do they question the statute’s unambiguous mandate that the court was required to dismiss the indictment upon Bert’s motion. The only question before us, therefore, is whether the district court abused its discretion in permitting Bert’s reprosecution by dismissing the indictment without prejudice.” P. 8-9.
“The Speedy Trial Act mandates that a criminal defendant must be brought to trial within 70 days of the filing of the indictment or the defendant’s initial appearance, whichever occurs later. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). If that deadline is not met, the Act provides that the indictment “shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Act excludes delays due to certain enumerated events from the 70‐day indictment‐to‐trial period. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).” P. 7
“It is well established that “Congress did not intend any particular type of dismissal to serve as the presumptive remedy for a Speedy Trial Act violation.” United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334 (1988); accord United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1983). Rather, “[t]he determination of whether to dismiss an indictment with or without prejudice is committed to the discretion of the district court.” United States v. Wilson, 11 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 1993).” P. 9. In making this consideration the Court should consider “the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.” United States v. Bert, 13-2328-cr, at * 10 (Sept. 10, 2015)(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)).
The Supreme Court instructed that, in the absence of prejudice or significant delay, courts should only preclude reprosecution of a serious crime upon a showing of “something more than an isolated unwitting violation,” such as a finding of “bad faith” or a “pattern of neglect.” Taylor, 487 U.S. at 339. But where the delay is indisputably grave and not a result of the defendant’s own conduct, Taylor, 487 U.S. at 343, dismissal with prejudice may be appropriate without such a finding, see United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[W]here the violation is substantial, a negligent failure to comply with the Act will not suffice to justify retrial.”). As the Supreme Court has explained in the context of a Sixth Amendment speedy trial challenge, “[a]lthough negligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused’s defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657 (1992). “‘The Act controls the conduct of the parties and the court itself during criminal pretrial proceedings. Not only must the court police the behavior of the prosecutor and the defense counsel, it must also police itself.’” Stayton, 791 F.2d at 20 (quoting Pringle, 751 F.2d at 429).
The District Court committed error in that “first, that the absence of bad faith, intentional delay, or some other form of heightened scienter is dispositive of this statutory factor; second, that a delay attributable to the court and not to the government tips this factor in favor of dismissal without prejudice. Both of these premises are contrary to governing precedent.” P. 16-17. The Second Circuit held that “[a] rule that limited the sanction of dismissal with prejudice exclusively to cases involving bad faith would contravene the well‐established principle that “[t]he Speedy Trial Act does not indicate a preference as between dismissals with and dismissals without prejudice.” Giambrone, 920 F.2d at 180 (citing Taylor, 487 U.S. at 334).” P. 18. Indeed, “District courts must hold themselves accountable for ensuring their own compliance with the Speedy Trial Act’s requirements. A district court may not merely assume responsibility for a speedy trial violation, deny an improper motive, and weigh this statutory factor in favor of dismissal without prejudice without offering further explanation.” Bert, at P. 19. In “the seriousness of the violation was ‘slighted’ and not ‘properly considered,’ Taylor, 487 U.S. at 337, and we proceed to a fuller examination.” P. 14. “Bert’s speedy trial clock had been expired for 266 days (almost 9 months). It is beyond cavil that this delay—which amounts to almost nine times the period of time automatically excluded for the resolution of such motions, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H), and almost four times the length of the speedy trial clock itself, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)—is serious” Bert, at P. 14
Conclusion: “Given the extended administrative neglect by the court and the government in allowing the case to stagnate for almost a year while Bert was incarcerated, we conclude that the government’s interest in administering justice by prosecuting Bert’s firearms offenses is outweighed by the impact that permitting reprosecution would have on the administration of justice and of the Speedy Trial Act.” P. 31
Dissent by Hon. Dennis Jacobs
Finding that “The only issue presented is whether the district court had discretion to dismiss this case under the Speedy Trial Act (as it did) without prejudice,” Judge Jacobs would have joined the majority. “The delay was occasioned by a one‐year interval in which the district court considered a suppression motion that was complicated, ramified, and virtually outcome‐determinative.”
Judge Jacobs cites several principles of which militate against dismissal with prejudice:
(1) As between dismissal with prejudice and without, “neither remedy [is to be] given priority,” United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 335 (1988);
(2) “[d]ismissal without prejudice is not a toothless sanction,” id. at 342; and
(3) “dismissal of a criminal indictment is a drastic remedy which should not be lightly considered,” United States v. Fox, 788 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1986).
Judge Jacobs states that “I agree with the majority that the Act serves important ends and must be enforced, and that it is integral to the administration of justice. But the majority implicitly assumes that the Act is disserved or impaired unless dismissal is with prejudice; and that assumption violates the background principles that dismissal without prejudice is not toothless, that the Act embodies no preference as to whether dismissal should be with prejudice or without, and that the choice is confided to the discretion of the district court.” In sum, he does not agree with the remedy the Second Circuit chose because “the delay [of the District Court] was an isolated instance; there was no bad faith or pattern of delay or misconduct by the prosecutors, or by the judge, or by the court as a whole; and, under the circumstances, no incentive for abuse can be identified, let alone be said to arise…” and, accordingly, he felt that the District Court’s judgment should be affirmed.
The case is United States v. Bert, 13-2328-cr (Sept. 10, 2015).