Tag: Dismissal

The Defendant was charged with, inter alia, unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree. It is alleged that the Defendant went into someone else’s car and stole their wallet… The People do not give us much more information other than that. The issue here becomes whether the charging instrument was facially sufficient or, put another way, whether the charging instrument alleges facts of an evidentiary nature supporting or tending to support the charge and provides reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense charged. See CPL 100.15(3) and CPL 100.40(4). The Court notes that there are no allegations that the defendant took any action or interfered with the victim’s possession or use of the car. The instrument charging the defendant did not allege or demonstrate that the defendant took any sort of control over the vehicle but merely entered the vehicle to obtain the victim’s wallet.

New York Criminal Defense Attorneys, it is important to note that an argument concerning an accusatory instrument’s facial sufficiency is jurisdictional and must be reviewed even if the defendant failed to raise it in the Criminal Court. Pp. 2 (citing People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 (1987)). Thus, defendant’s claim was not forfeited upon his plea of guilty. Id. (citing People v. Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 (2010); People v. Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 573 (2004). Here the allegations presented in the charging instrument did not allege anything in regards to the defendant taking control, driving, moving or interfering with the use of the  victim’s car in any matter. Although the allegations are of a nature that the defendant entered the car, the charging instrument did not provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had engaged in the unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, to which he plead guilty. “[T]he judgment of conviction is reversed, defendant’s guilty plea is vacated, the count of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree is dismissed, the remaining counts of the instrument are reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Criminal Court for all further proceedings on the remaining counts of the accusatory instrument.” Pp. 4.

The case is The People v. Gavrilov, 2013-135 K CR, NYLJ 1202741921574, at 1 (App. Tm., 2nd, Decided October 21, 2015) accessible at httpwww.newyorklawjournal.comid=1202741921574The-People-v-Gavrilov-2013135-K-CR#ixzz3r5owGKud

On October 23, 2015, the New York Law Journal (Joel Stashenko) published the article “Woman’s Conviction for Conduct Affecting Fetus Is Dismissed” Arguably, the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office should not have brought the case and this woman should not have been convicted of manslaughter for the death of her 6-day-old baby from in-utero injuries sustained in a car accident that she caused by being under the influence.

The conviction of Jennifer Jorgensen for a May 2008 accident in Suffolk County where authorities say her vehicle crossed the center line of a busy road and smashed head-on into an oncoming vehicle, killing its occupants. Jorgensen, who police said was incapacitated by alcohol and/or prescription medications, was 34 weeks pregnant at the time. Jorgenson, not wearing a seatbelt at the time, injured her unborn baby when she struck the steering column in the crash and was delivered by cesarian section.

“Thirteen months [after her child’s death], defendant [(Jorgensen)] was indicted on three counts of manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law §125.15 [1]), one count of aggravated vehicular homicide (Penal Law §125.14), and one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the combined influence of alcohol or drugs (Vehicle & Traffic Law §1192 [4-a]). After the first jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict, the parties proceeded to a second trial on all counts.” People v. Jorgensen, No. 179, NYLJ 1202740469239, at *2 (Ct. of App., Decided October 22, 2015)

The issue the Court of Appeals reached “is whether a woman can be convicted of manslaughter for reckless conduct that she engaged in while pregnant that caused injury to the fetus in utero where the child was born alive but died as a result of that injury days later.” Jorgensen, at *3.

The Court made clear that “[t]he imposition of criminal liability upon pregnant women for acts committed against a fetus that is later born and subsequently dies as a result of injuries sustained while in utero should be clearly defined by the legislature, not the courts. It should also not be left to the whim of the prosecutor.” Jorgensen, at *7 The Court of Appeals held “that it is evident from the statutory scheme that the legislature, in enacting Penal Law §125.05 (1) and §125.15 (1), did not intend to hold pregnant women criminally responsible for conduct with respect to themselves and their unborn fetuses unless such conduct is done intentionally.” Jorgensen, at *3.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Second Department and dismissed the remaining indictment.

Dissenting, Justice Fahey indicated that “[w]here, as here, the baby-victim is born alive but subsequently dies, the Penal Law allows for the conviction of a defendant-mother of manslaughter in the second degree where the acts causing the baby’s death occurred before that infant was born….” That seemed to be the difference here. If Jorgensen did not consent to having the C-Section, this probably would have never become an issue. Nonetheless, as the prosecutor argued it, J. Fahey addressed it.