You have the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Anyone who has ever heard of a television show probably has heard the television version of the Miranda Rights: You have the right to remain silent; you have the right to an attorney; things you say can be used against you; you can waive those rights; etc. Even with these rights, defendants talk. You can waive that right under certain circumstances. People who feel they have nothing to hide and did nothing wrong speak to the police. Bad idea:
Should you be confronted by the Police you have the right to remain silent (you must communicate that you are exercising that right) and the right to an attorney. In New York you have the indelible right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination. Should you find yourself being questioned by the police, demand an attorney: Call the Law Offices of Cory H. Morris. Here, in People v. Clerevin, the Appellate Division of the Second Department found that the defendant’s Miranda rights were violated. The Defendant asserted he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights because of mental deficiency.
Although more than fifty years old now, Miranda is still good law:
“[F]or a statement to be admissible, the People must prove a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination” (People v Aveni, 100 AD3d 228, 236 [citations omitted]; see People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 292; People v Williams, 62 NY2d 285, 288). “Whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her rights to remain silent and to an attorney is determined upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” (People v Santos, 112 AD3d 757, 758 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Williams, 62 NY2d at 288), including the defendant’s “age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he [or she] has the capacity to understand the warnings given him [or her], the nature of his [or her] Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights” (Fare v Michael C., 442 US 707, 725). Where a “person of subnormal intelligence” is involved, “close scrutiny must be made of the circumstances of the asserted waiver” (People v Williams, 62 NY2d at 289).
The crux of many complaints, it took over a year and a half for the Bronx Criminal Court to dismiss the charges against a criminal defendant on speedy trial grounds. Often confusing to both practitioners and clients, the New York speedy trial rule is codified in the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL). New York Criminal Defendants have both a constitutional right to a speedy trial as well as a statutory right to speedy trial. Generally speaking, the issue of whether the People (New York District Attorneys) have satisfied their obligation, statutorily, under CPL §30.30 is determined by (1) “computing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People’s declaration of readiness”; (2) “subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute”; and then (3) “adding to the result any post-readiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion.” People v. Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 (1992).
After the people announce ready, the defendant generally has the burden of showing that adjournments should be charged to the People. See People v. Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 541 (1985); People v. Daniels, 217 AD2d 448, 452 (1st Dep’t. 1995), Iv dismissed, 88 NY2d 917 (1996). This is often where the waters get murky and people get confused. more
Police are allowed to interact with citizens from on day to day encounters. Whether buying a cup of coffee or saying hello, police officers have that latitude to speak to people during their tour of duty. The question becomes when does the interaction from the police become one where the approach and, (what likely follows), the subsequent seizure and/or search becomes illegal.
The testimony at the suppression hearing established that at approximately 6:30 p.m. on January 18, 2013, a Buffalo police officer and his partner were conducting a traffic stop in the parking lot of a gas station when they observed defendant and two other men walking down the sidewalk on the other side of the street in a “higher crime area.” According to the officer, defendant was “staring” at him and his partner or at their marked patrol vehicle. Upon concluding the traffic stop, the officers crossed the street in their vehicle in order to drive alongside the men, the officer asked, “what’s up, guys?” from the rolled-down passenger window, and defendant then put his head down and started walking away at a faster pace. The officer thereafter observed defendant drop a gun holster to the ground and, after exiting the vehicle and picking up the holster, the officer saw defendant discard a handgun into nearby bushes. The officer’s partner positioned the patrol vehicle to cut off defendant’s path of travel, and defendant was eventually apprehended.
Pp. 1-2 (external quotation marks omitted). Here, the Defendant pled guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The appeal comes by way of the Defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court was wrong in refusing to suppress physical evidence, namely the handgun. The issue here is the police approach as described above.
Defendant is charged with one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law ‘265.01 ). A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when he “possesses any dagger, dangerous knife, dirk, razor, stiletto, imitation pistol, or any other dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon with intent to use the same unlawfully against another.” (Penal Law ‘ 265.01 ).
The Court frames the issue: “[t]he questions presented here are whether the allegations — that an officer found a knife on the floor of defendant’s car and that defendant made a statement indicating that he possessed the knife for self-protection — establish reasonable cause to believe (1) that defendant knowingly possessed a “dangerous knife” and (2) that he possessed the knife with the intent to use it unlawfully against another. Defendant contends that the allegations are insufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe that he had the intent to use the knife unlawfully against another.” Pp. 1-2. After reiterating the legal standard for facial insufficient (see Pp. 2), the Court recites the legal standard for Reasonable Cause:
“Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it” Pp. 5. See CPL 70.10 ). “Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense” focuses upon the issue of whether the evidence is of sufficient weight and persuasiveness to establish a reasonable likelihood a defendant committed the offense. Peter Preiser, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated, CPL 70.10)…. The measure of “reasonable cause” is the equivalent of the familiar constitutional standard called “probable cause” (People v. Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 402, n. 2 ).
For either to exist, the evidence must be strong enough to support a reasonable belief that it is more probable than not that a defendant committed a crime (see People v. Mercado, 68 NY2d 874, 877 ). When “evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances” (CPL 70.10 [b]) which favor equally guilt or innocence the reasonable cause standard is not met (People v. Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254  [“conduct equally compatible with guilt or innocence will not suffice”]).
Although the Court finds that it is clear (by his statements and the surrounding circumstances of its recovery) that the Defendant possessed a knife, it is unclear whether the Defendant possessed the intent to actually use that knife. The defendant indicated that it was dangerous out there and that he needed the knife for self-protection. By establishing possession of a “dangerous knife”, the People are entitled to the statutory presumption that defendant intended to use the knife unlawfully against another. (Penal Law §265.15). The presumption establishes reasonable cause but can be overcome by the defendant. more
In a strange twist, a convicted felon, pro se, wins another crack at a suppression hearing on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court noted that the “record is sufficient to establish that defendant received ineffective assistance when his trial counsel failed to move to reopen the suppression hearing based on trial testimony” contradicting a previous statement(s) by law enforcement. Pp. 2. Noting the standard for reopening a suppression hearing, the Court observed that:
Under CPL 710.40(4), a suppression hearing may be reopened upon a showing that the defendant has discovered “additional pertinent facts” that “could not have [been] discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the motion.” Here, the additional facts were “pertinent” because the superintendent’s testimony, if credited, would have undermined the ruling that the tools were admissible because they were in plain view. This was not a minor or routine inconsistency; the superintendent’s version was completely at odds with a plain view theory. Any issue of whose recollection was most reliable should have been presented to the hearing court. With regard to the “reasonable diligence” requirement, the People argue that it was not met here because defendant, who was standing several feet from the superintendent when the police arrived, was in a position to know whether the bag was closed or open at the time. Under the rule the People posit, evidence adduced for the first time from a witness at trial — no matter how reliable the witness, how unlikely he or she would have been to cooperate with the defense investigation before trial, or how conclusively his or her testimony would undermine the suppression ruling — would never entitle a defendant to a reopened hearing, so long as the defendant was in a position where he or she could have observed the same events as the witness. We reject such a narrow reading of the statute (see e.g. People v. Figliolo, 207 AD2d 679 [1st Dept 1994]). While, as a general matter, a defendant may be presumed to have knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his or her arrest (see People v. Hankins, 265 AD2d 572 [2d Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 880 ), that presumption is not mandatory, and the principle does not mandate the conclusion that such knowledge existed under the particular facts of this case.
The Court notes that the Defendant “could not have known that a People’s witness would completely contradict the police officers on the critical suppression issue. Moreover, if at the hearing, he had taken the stand to present his account of the arrest, his credibility would have been subject to impeachment because his status as an interested witness and his lengthy criminal record.” Pp. 2. In making its conclusion, the Court finds that “it is far more likely that counsel, who did not represent defendant at the suppression hearing, did not focus on the contradiction and gave no thought to a motion to reopen. More importantly, even if the dissent is correct about counsel’s subjective belief that the superintendent was mistaken about the police opening the bag, it is difficult to comprehend how opting not to give the court the opportunity to make that credibility determination for itself can be deemed a competent strategy.” P. 3. more
In Chemung County, New York, ” Defendant was charged by indictment with assault in the second degree stemming from an incident in July 2012 where he allegedly ran over his girlfriend, Deborah Meyer, with a pickup truck.” Pp. 1.
At issue was the “County Court [ruling] that the witness could not speculate as to whom defendant had directed his comment, and the witness’s testimony in that regard was stricken from the record.” Pp. 2. Nonetheless, the People twice made improper references to the stricken testimony and twice those references went without objection from defense counsel or curative instructions from the court.” Id.
Rule: “To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the basis of [a] single failure to object, defendant must show both that the objection omitted by trial counsel is a winning argument…and that the objection was one that no reasonable defense lawyer, in the context of the trial, could have thought to be ‘not worth raising.'” People v. Brown, 17 NY3d 742, 743-744 (2011), quoting People v. Turner, 5 NY3d 476, 481 (2005)). “In our view, defendant has met his burden of demonstrating a lack of strategic or other legitimate reason for his defense lawyer’s failure to object.” Pp. 2 (citing People v. Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709 (1988)).
Under the circumstances, the Court found “that no reasonable defense lawyer could have thought that such an objection would not have been worth making,” and , therefore, this constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Pp. 3 Judgment is reversed and the matter is remitted for a new trial.
The case is People v. Ramsey, 106652, NYLJ 1202744267116, at 1 (App. Div., 3rd, Decided December 3, 2015)
The First Department reviewed a conviction and did not find harmless error to uphold the conviction. Here, the “Defendant’s right of confrontation was violated by testimonial hearsay evidence that went beyond the permissible scope of explanatory background material….Defendant was further deprived of his right to a fair trial by other portions of the prosecutor’s summation…The court’s statements during jury deliberation were also prejudicial to defendant’s right to a fair trial…[therefore,] [t[he totality of the circumstances supports an inference that the jury was improperly coerced into returning a compromise verdict.” People v DeJesus, 2015 NY Slip Op 08959 (1st Dep’t. Dec. 8, 2015). What happened here?
Among the problems stated by the First Department in reaching their decision, I focus on one in particular:
During jury deliberations, the court should have granted defendant’s mistrial motion, made on the ground that any verdict would be reached under coercive circumstances. The court’s statements during jury deliberation were also prejudicial to defendant’s right to a fair trial. The jury returned two notes, on the second and fourth day of deliberations, announcing that the jury was deadlocked; the second note emphatically listed different types of evidence the jury had considered. The court’s Allen charges in response to both notes were mostly appropriate but presented the prospect of protracted deliberations by improperly stating that the jury had only deliberated for a very short time when it had actually deliberated for days (see People v Aponte, 2 NY3d 304, 308-309  [trial court improperly stated, among other things, that it was “nowhere near” the point when it would find a hung jury, where deliberation had lasted two days]). The court initially informed the jury that its hours on one day would be extended to 7:00 p.m., before reversing that decision and merely extending the hours to 5:00 p.m., and then it extended the hours to 6:00 p.m. on the next day, a Friday. The court improperly described those changes as a “tremendous accommodation” that was “loathed” by the system (see People v Huarotte, 134 AD2d 166, 170-171 [1st Dept 1987]; see also Aponte, 2 NY3d at 308 [finding reversible error where, among other things,Allen charge “suggested that the jurors were failing in their duty”]). Pp. 1-2 (external quotation marks omitted and internal citations and quotations preserved).
In light of other criminal cases coming out of the Bronx (e.g. Kalief Browder), it is important to emphasize the neutral role the judge is to play while making sure the rights of the defendant are not violated by the prosecutor. In this case, the First Department concluded that “there is a significant probability that defendant would have been acquitted if not for the violation of his right of confrontation, the prosecutor’s improper statements in summation, and the court’s improper statements during deliberation.” Pp. 2 (citing People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 242 (1975)). The case is People v DeJesus, 2015 NY Slip Op 08959, (1st Dep’t. Dec. 8, 2015). A new trial was ordered. The case is People v DeJesus, 2015 NY Slip Op 08959.
The Defendant here was charged with murder in the second degree. After he came upon a man hitting his brother in the head with a hammer, he stabbed what became the victim. The Defendant testified that he was in his own home when his ex-wife told him that someone was beating his brother up with a hammer down the block. Defendant testified that he ran onto the victim’s porch, tried to break up the fight, and, in the scurry, stabbed the victim in the chest with a knife.
Procedural History: “The jury acquitted defendant of second degree murder, but found him guilty of manslaughter in the first degree. Supreme Court subsequently sentenced defendant to 25 years in prison, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment of conviction (114 AD3d 1134 [4th Dept 2014]), and a Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal (23 NY3d 1044 ).” Pp. 6.
At issue here was the jury instruction of Justification and whether the initial aggressor exception to the justification defense misstates the applicable law where defendant intervened in an already existing fight. Indeed:
At the charge conference, Supreme Court indicated that it would, at defendant’s request, give a charge on the justification defense. Defendant then specifically requested that the court read the standard criminal jury instruction on justification, but exclude the portion that addressed the initial aggressor rule, because defendant did not “stand in the shoes of anybody initially involved in the fight.” Alternatively, defendant argued that, if an initial aggressor charge “were to be used at all[, it] should indicate the first person to use deadly force, not offensive force.” In contrast, the People asserted that there was “a fair view of the evidence to show that…defendant [was] acting in concert with” his brother and girlfriend, which “makes him accountable as an initial aggressor.”